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Metaphors and Analogies occupy a prominent place in our scientific discourses as well as 
throughout all human communication. In literary studies, linguistics, and the social sciences 
metaphor is often understood as a communicative trope—the application of a descriptive term to 
something to which it does not literally apply. That traditional characterization of metaphor 
assumes that language is a symbol (or code) system which is processed in the head of each 
individual, and that metaphor is a kind of processing of symbols. From that perspective metaphor 
is a purely linguistic phenomenon.  Since the mid-twentieth century this traditional idea has been 
questioned and nowadays there are several important lines of research pointing to the importance 
of metaphor as more than an ornament of speech. The idea that metaphor is a fundamental aspect 
of human thought was forcefully argued in Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By. For 
them, concepts and human language are ultimately metaphorical. That book and the extensive 
and growing literature elaborating related views has deep philosophical significance. To what 
extent are metaphors constitutive of thought and exactly what is meant by this assertion? If 
metaphors are constitutive of thought, are we not obliged to defend some sort of “cognitive 
relativism” which invites us to think that reality is ours to rewrite? One can formulate the 
discussion as leading to a choice between two exclusive alternatives: either metaphors tell us 
what reality is (and thus depending on the metaphors we use reality is different) or else 
metaphors ultimately are just tools that when used appropriately help us to track reality, and 
when used inappropriately mislead us. This dichotomy must be rejected, however. Metaphors 
help us to understand reality by guiding us to construct the right concepts for the task at hand. It 
follows that the distinction between the role of metaphors in communicating knowledge and their 
explanatory role cannot be sharply distinguished.  
In the next section we show that the role of metaphors in communication involves their 
participation in shaping the meaning of what is communicated.  In section 3 we will make clear 
why metaphor should be understood as something more than a figure of language. Taking lesson 
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from anthropologists and psychologists, we will use the term material metaphor to emphasize the 
importance of the embodied, material dimension of metaphors. In section 4 we will present a 
series of cases from the history of science that illustrate different ways in which metaphor plays a 
role in processes of scientific innovation. These are divided in three parts. First, we examine the 
role of metaphors in making relativity theory acceptable to a wider community, thereby 
supporting the assimilation of the scientific change that this radical theory implied. In section 4.2 
we will examine how Darwin used a series of related metaphors to develop his theory of 
evolution, and in section 4.3 how scientists in the late 18th century used different metaphors to 
develop explanatory models for nerve excitation.  
2. Metaphors communicate and constitute what is being communicated.   
 
Psychologists, linguists and communication scientists have shown that metaphors play a 
leading role in how we conceive of the topics expressed by it, often implicitly. Even if we are not 
aware of it, mentioning a metaphor in relation to an event often leads us to certain beliefs or 
predisposes us to act in ways promoted by the metaphor. Major events like the COVID-19 
pandemic have generated a lot of discussions about the sort of metaphors that should be used to 
communicate the state of the situation to the general public. Initially (and still often in many 
places) the pandemic has been often described using metaphors related to war. The President of 
the United States of America, Donald Trump, incessantly used the metaphor of war in his 
evaluation of the health crisis. Paying attention to the role of metaphors in the communication 
about COVID-19 became the topic of #ReframeCovid, an international initiative searching for 
alternative metaphors to the predominant war metaphors. This effort is quite important because it 
is well known that the metaphors we use lead to associations and beliefs that might be 
misleading or undesirable. By personifying the virus as a foreign enemy, war metaphors tend to 
reinforce xenophobia and racism and also tend to justify authoritarian measures associated with 
countries in war. Elena Semino, a linguist expert on metaphors, suggests that media should 
promote instead the use of metaphors like “forest fire”, and metaphors related with prevention, 
thus discouraging our readiness to think in terms of conflict (between countries in particular) and 
promoting a more cooperative attitude (2021). Notice that such concepts associated to the 
metaphor “go together” and support each other (see Carrillo 2018). A forest fire requires 
cooperation, a vigilant attitude to prevent further fires, and firefighters—not soldiers and 
weapons. Prevention and precautionary measures are key resources for dealing with a forest fire.  
Critical events like a pandemic have consequences for the way we perceive ourselves in 
the world and lead to the reorganization of social life, often in rather unexpected ways. It is not 
feasible to separate the issue of communication from the question about the role of metaphors in 
constituting the world (via their role in explanation), unless we make very strong metaphysical 
assumptions about the reality that matters. But the nature of this reality is not something we can 
assume beforehand; it has to be the result of scientific empirical research. When 
communicologists talk about the problem of how best to communicate about COVID-19 it is not 
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assumed that there is something which is really COVID-19, independently of how we shape it as 
a social reality (which can be very different across different communities).  
 3. Science is Culture and Culture is Material Metaphor 
 
In anthropology and archaeology metaphors increasingly play a major role in explaining 
the way in which the cultural representation of social experience takes place. In several traditions 
of anthropology, metaphors are taken to be central to the development of social strategies 
responsible for the stability and change of individual and group identities. Metaphors lead to 
major shifts in social organization, particularly through metaphors embodied in rituals and social 
practices. When metaphors play this role they are often referred to as material metaphors. The 
term is usually associated with a view of cognition as extended or situated, that is, as taking 
place not only in the head. One of the most basic (material) metaphors is that of the body as a 
container (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Gamble 2012). The container metaphor plays a key role in 
the development of musical instruments and technologies, from ceramic pots to computers. As 
we shall see in section 4.3 the container metaphor also played an important role in the 
development of the theory of electricity and neurophysiology.  
There are different ways in which the concept of material metaphor has been understood. 
For us it is enough to say that a material metaphor is a metaphor the basis of which is material 
culture. Material culture is culture understood as the patterns of interaction constituting the 
structure of social life and thus our interactions with other people, institutions and artifacts (and 
technology of course). This is a very rough characterization of material culture, but it is 
sufficient for our purposes. The main point is that material culture involves our doings in the 
world understood as collective resources for organizing and maintaining social life (for example 
in habits, practices and institutions).  
 As situated (embodied, enacted and extended) cognition theories have been developed in 
recent cognitive science, and in particular in enactivist approaches to cognition, the concept of 
material metaphor has gained importance. Such views of cognition are leading to major changes 
in the social sciences and anthropology (see for example Coward and Gamble’s 2010 Metaphor 
and Materiality in early prehistory). The attention to the grounding of metaphor in our skillful 
interaction with our surroundings has become a powerful tool for models of human evolution and 
explanations of cultural development. Concretely, it allows the incorporation of (patterns of) 
behavior in the sort of things that can be brought to play an explanatory role even when we have 
no direct evidence of such behavior.   
The key idea behind the concept of material metaphor has also been developed in several 
areas of psychology. For example, the metaphoric role of gestures is by now widely recognized 
as playing an important role in human communication. Gestures can be understood as “material 
carriers of thinking” (McNeill 2000), and it is also quite clear by now that at least many gestures 
are metaphors. Wilhelm Wundt in 1922 called those gestures that transfer concepts from one 
domain to another “symbolic gestures”, and the paradigmatic example of such kind of gesture 
are gestures that represent temporal concepts. In many (but not all) cultures, the future is ahead, 
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in front of us, and we have well known gestures to indicate such idea. In one of the first 
experimentally based accounts of the metaphoric role of gestures, McNeill (1992) talks of 
metaphoric gestures presenting an image of an abstraction (like time). For us, then, gestures (or 
at least an important kind of gestures) are material metaphors.  
Communicative gestures of the sort McNeill calls metaphoric gestures, are constitutive of 
social interactions. Material metaphors like a ritual or a protocol in a scientific experiment have 
as material basis not a specific human body, but complex cultural artifacts, including skills and a 
performance space which constraints and norms the performance. Rituals and material metaphors 
in general can be seen as social gestures, gestures not situated in particular individual bodies but 
articulated in networks of patterns of interaction like habits and protocols in scientific 
laboratories. In the next section we show how metaphors, and material metaphors in particular, 
play an important role in processes of innovation in science. 
4. Metaphor, Innovation and Science  
 
 Innovation involves finding an unprecedented way to address a situation that brings about 
some improvement with respect to the outcome the previous course of action used to have. What 
constitutes innovation has been a topic of increasing importance in the social sciences, education, 
and the biological and cognitive sciences since the 1960s. The key idea of traditional approaches 
is that innovations have to overcome the inertia caused by old ways of doing things, which leads 
specific people or communities to reject an innovation that from a “rational” or “purely 
economic” perspective should be accepted at once. In other words, innovation, in the form of 
concepts, technologies, or ways of organization, is often seen as something that happens or is 
generated somehow in society; and studies of innovation principally aim to explain the factors 
that impede their acceptance. But this approach to the study of innovation leaves aside the 
problem of the source of innovation. This problem cannot be separated from the problem of how 
innovations overcome old ways of doing things and ends up improving ways of doing things (in 
relation to a given end). Our answer is that metaphors play a key role in accounting for the 
source of innovation, and the acceptance of an innovation is closely related with the acceptance 
of the related metaphors. 
From the traditional perspective of science as theory-centered it is common to think of 
metaphors as mere embellishment, or as crutches for understanding to be left at the door once we 
are capable of understanding the “real” thing (which most often means arriving at a mathematical 
formulation of a theory). There are important exceptions. Mary Hesse famously argued that all 
meaning is metaphorical, and this thesis was part of her “network theory of meaning.”  Her main 
idea is related with what we have pointed out above, that metaphors play a role in the 
construction of meaning most often through the mutual support of different metaphors. However, 
her thesis was still too concerned with the problem of meaning of theories. Here we provide a 
version of a network theory of meaning that incorporates in a central place the role of material 
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metaphors, and thus the importance of the metaphoric force of artifacts (and instruments in 
particular).  
As the example of the role of metaphors in COVID-19 suggests, and the scientific cases 
we present in the following cases make clear, metaphors are not mere embellishment. They often 
play a major role promoting or hindering the development of innovations in science, as they play 
a key role in passing – from generation to generation of scientists – the knowledge, normative 
frameworks and skills distinctive of a given practice.  
 As mentioned in the introduction, using particular metaphors can change the way we 
frame our problems, and the kind of solutions we propose. Innovation in science is usually 
associated with words like “revolution” and thus the expectation of discontinuities becomes 
associated with processes of innovation. But we can think, for example, of innovation in science 
as mainly a process of “growth” and then of course the connotations are quite different. If we 
think of science as a process of growth, there is an implicit suggestion that innovations are part 
of a continuous and “organic” kind of change. The “revolution” and “growth” metaphors can be 
beneficial or misleading, and each can apply to different kinds of change and can be useful in 
different contexts to communicate the way innovations take place in different areas of science in 
different times. We have already mentioned that there is a lot of empirical research in 
experimental psychology showing the importance of metaphors in shaping our beliefs and 
guiding us to act in certain ways. Such metaphors play a foundational role in innovation. They 
exploit what we already know from different contexts, and this leads often to changes of 
meaning or behavior that can end up being considered innovations. If metaphors have a major 
cognitive role in the organization and growth of our concepts in everyday life, this should also be 
the case in science. The question is how this takes place and what is its relevance for the 
distinctive kind of understanding which science affords. 
Next we present different ways in which metaphors shape scientific concepts and play a 
role in the development of scientific practices and traditions of research. Recall that metaphors 
are not mere happenings inside the mind of an individual, but have to be understood as a 
collectively and materially driven phenomenon occurring within social practices. Most often, 
metaphors play a role in the construction of concepts by joining forces and getting entangled in 
webs of belief, habits and skills. In science this mutually supporting role of metaphors, habits 
and beliefs plays a very important role in the generation of innovations. The reason is that the 
different, mutually supporting (material) metaphors extend our skills and allows us to apply them 
for the development of novel experiments, theories and models, thus generating new knowledge 
or skills. When this is the case, it is important consider the material basis of the metaphor to 
understand its meaning. As we will see in section 4.3, material metaphors are particularly 
important in experimental sciences. Let us insist here that there is no clear distinction between 
plain metaphor and material metaphor. The term material metaphor is being used to emphasize 
this situated, collective and developmental understanding of metaphor grounded in the material 
culture of science. The next three subsections aim to illustrate the way that metaphors enable 
innovation in science in different ways.  
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4.1 Metaphor and Scientific Change 
 
We might be willing to recognize the impact of metaphors in cultural changes in general, 
but reject the influence of metaphors in the advancement of science. After all, traditional views 
of science maintain the idea that science is culture, but a different kind of culture altogether: 
science advances, not only changes. But the idea that science is a fundamentally different kind of 
cultural enterprise has been challenged by decades of work in the history and sociology of 
science, and is nowadays also challenged by advances in the cognitive sciences. Thomas Kuhn 
famously questioned this traditional view of science. His 1962 book starts by claiming that a 
change in our way of viewing the history of science is necessary to have a better appreciation of 
what is science: “History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could 
produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed.” For 
Kuhn science is culture, and as for any culture, history is crucial for understanding it. 
Contemporary history of science and other social studies of science have gone way beyond Kuhn 
in studying science as culture. The cognitive sciences have also contributed a lot to this task 
since they provide ways of understanding cognition as a cultural achievement (above and beyond 
the achievement of particular individuals). The role of metaphors in conceptual development is 
an important part of this trend. 
Einstein’s famous 1905 papers are often mentioned as the beginning of a new era in 
science, not only in physics. Hermann Minkowski famously formulated Einstein basic idea as 
follows: “Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere 
shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality” (Minkowski, 
1908). This is a powerful metaphor. Einstein is considered the author of the special theory of 
relativity because he developed a mathematical framework and a physical interpretation that 
made it possible to reconceptualize physics, subordinating the categories of space and time to the 
concept of spacetime. The reformulation of Einstein’s theory in terms of Minkowski’s metaphor 
led to a general acceptance of the theory and provided a very clear contrast with the former 
Newtonian physics. The change is momentous. The history of physics up to this point had been 
developed under the idea that time and space were ontologically two different kinds of entities. 
Kant had famously given shape to this deep “intuition” supporting the classical framework in a 
sophisticated philosophical theory. The idea that space and time were mere shadows sounded so 
counterintuitive to the ears of classical physicists and philosophers that even if willing to accept 
Einstein’s theory as basically right, they tended to reject Minkowski’s “metaphorical” 
formulation of the idea. But in the end this metaphor grew into one of the major 
reconceptualizations of physics; it plays a crucial role in the theory of general relativity and has 
had a broad cultural impact.  
In academic circles, Einstein’s theory also led to the development of concepts like 
Bahktin’s chronotope, which elaborates the complementarity of space and time in literary 
analysis. Major literary works took inspiration from a metaphorical understanding of Einstein’s 
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theory. E. E. Cummins invented the term “wherewhen,” and the parody of the scientific method 
in the Ulysses of James Joyce is famous. The work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Robert Musil, Vladimir 
Mayakowski and Lawrence Durrel are examples in which in different ways the concept of 
relativity of Einstein was used as basis for the metaphorical elaboration of concepts of relativity 
in art and science. The change between classical art and modern art was often compared to the 
break between the Newtonian and the Einstenian views of the world. The idea that Einstein’s 
revolutionary change in worldview should lead to major changes in philosophy and the 
humanities was echoed in literature and cultural analysis by major philosophers like Bertrand 
Russell and Ortega y Gasset. The idea that Einstein’s theory could be and should be extended to 
our understanding of morality and aesthetics was also widely shared.  
Another major breakthrough in science whose acceptance was forged with metaphors is 
that of the theory of evolution. When Darwin published his book On the Origin of Species in 
1859 a major discussion ensued. Most philosophers and scientists that were contemporary of 
Darwin did not see any major innovation in Darwin’s thinking. Herbert Spencer was a highly 
respected natural philosopher in the second half of the nineteenth century, who had written 
several books on a theory of evolution. Spencer thought (as many contemporaries did), that 
Darwin’s theory was simply a series of well-documented empirical cases confirming his own 
views about evolution. Darwin was well aware of this possible misunderstanding and it is well 
documented that he carefully crafted paragraphs in order to avoid that his theory of evolution by 
natural selection were confused with Spencer’s (and that of other writers of the time). Darwin 
was so keen in avoiding the confusion that he avoided the use of the term “evolution” in his 
book. Spencer thought that all change in nature is a consequence of what he called “the survival 
of the fittest” a phrase supporting a powerful metaphor introduced by Thomas Malthus. This 
metaphor was widely accepted as a fundamental truth propelling the “evolution” of biological 
species, which also served as an explanation for many prejudices, for instance that some human 
“races” were more advanced than others. Ultimately, for Spencer and most of his 
contemporaries, this was a fundamental law behind all natural changes, a law that lead to the 
increase of complexity. All cultural achievements, as well as all natural processes were subject to 
this law. Spencer for example, spent a whole book explaining how the historical development of 
western music could be explained as a consequence of this universal law. 
Darwin was careful to avoid that his theory be confused with such views of evolution, but 
for decades the confusion was rampant. Beliefs and metaphors supporting a teleological 
understanding of human history (and all kind of history, including the history of life) were so 
prevalent that Darwin’s innovation was not readily understood. Nonetheless, it has to be 
recognized that metaphors like the one of the architect can be misleading. Such metaphor can be 
taken to suggest the role of supernatural intelligence in accounting for evolution, after all, the 
reference to God as an architect was also common. Metaphors in general are ambiguous and 
precisely because it is the mutual support of several different metaphors that is often important to 
arrive to the intended meaning of an innovative theory, as we see below.   
	   8	  
4.2 Metaphors Supporting Theories   
 
Darwin’s major concept of natural selection is initially a metaphor which is explained in 
combination with several other metaphors. Among such metaphors is the tree of life, which 
describes the diversity of life and the way such diversity has taken place through the history of 
life, as a consequence of natural selection – another metaphor. These metaphors join forces with 
many other metaphors. In Darwin’s work, for example, the famous metaphor of the wedge fits 
nicely to suggest the way natural selection explains the diversity of life: “The face of Nature may 
be compared to a yielding surface, with ten thousand sharp wedges packed close together and 
driven inwards by incessant blows, sometimes one wedge being struck, and then another with 
greater force” (Darwin 1859).  
 
Figure 1. Charles Darwin's first diagram of an evolutionary tree,  
from his First Notebook on Transmutation of Species (1837).  
Source: Wikimedia Commons. 
 
Notice that the different metaphors are not repetitions, each of them emphasizes different 
aspects of the process he is characterizing, namely the process of evolution (by natural selection). 
The reference to a wedge and the geological context brings the attention to a very important 
aspect of Darwin’s theory, the need to recognize the consequences of a relatively insignificant 
force through long periods of time (the kind of forces Lyell and other biogeographers of a few 
decades earlier had recognized and identified as causes of major geological changes in the 
planet). Whereas Spencer used the metaphor of the struggle for existence to describe the 
consequences of a fundamental organizing principle of nature characterized a priori, a principle 
guiding all changes in natural processes, Darwin’s kit of metaphors undermines  Spencer’s idea 
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that certain traits will spread and stabilize as if some intelligence had selected them. In other 
words, Darwin is using the metaphor to explain away the sort of metaphysical assumption 
supporting contemporary theories like Spencer’s. In particular, the wedge metaphor makes the 
point (to a cultivated reader aware of the recent theories about the evolution of the surface of the 
planet) that there is no need of such intelligence. Small insignificant forces through long periods 
of time can have major effects. Darwin could expect his readers to be familiar with analogous 
arguments about the importance of small forces acting through long periods of time as an 
explanatory resource in Geology. This was a famous and well known theory by the time Darwin 
published his book. 
Another supporting metaphor entering Darwin’s argument for the key role of natural 
selection in evolution is the architect metaphor: “Fragments of rock fallen from a lofty precipice 
assume an infinitude of shapes—these shapes being due to the nature of the rock, the law of 
gravity &c—by merely selecting the well-shaped stones & rejecting the ill-shaped an architect... 
could make many & various noble buildings” (letter 1863). The raw material of natural selection, 
the varieties that result from imperfect processes of reproduction obey no preordained principle. 
The architect Darwin has in mind is not solving a puzzle, ordering dispersed pieces to bring forth 
an underlying order – it is a creative architect, managing to get order out of disorder. It is one 
thing to make a building with especially shaped stones, and it is another thing to manage to 
construct a beautiful building with pieces that were not made for that purpose. As he puts it in 
another of his books: “If our architect succeeded in rearing a noble edifice, using the rough 
wedge-shaped fragments for the arches, the longer stones for the lintels, and so forth, we should 
admire his skill even in a higher degree than if he had used stones shaped for the purpose” (1968, 
249). The metaphor of the architect emphasizes the sense in which Darwin’s theory aims to go 
beyond Spencer’s and other contemporary theories of evolution, precisely by denying the need of 
an underlying fundamental law, or a supernatural being supporting the creative role of natural 
selection.  
Darwin recognized that he could not give a causal account for the source of innovations 
required for natural selection to work. Wallace formulated the objection very clearly: natural 
selection could explain the survival of the fittest, but not the origin of the innovations 
characterizing the fittest (see Martinez 2000, 2019). Darwin had no resources to formulate a full 
causal explanation, but with metaphor and analogy he had already managed to change the terms 
of the discussion. 
4.3 Metaphor, Explanation and Laboratory Culture   
 
Material metaphors are particularly important in experimental science. Perhaps the metaphor that 
played the most prominent role in driving neurophysiological research in the second half of the 
1700’s is the Leyden jar. The Leyden jar was invented around 1745. A precursor of modern 
capacitors, this artifact consists of a glass jar whose lower half is covered in the inside and the 
outside with thin sheets of metal. This device is capable of becoming electrically charged and 
holding that charge for future use. As its name suggests, the Leyden jar was metaphorically seen 
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as a container of electricity. It was usually used in combination with the electrostatic generator 
that has a turning wheel rubbing onto a cloth and so charges a metal with electrostatic electricity. 
The metal is then put in contact with the jar’s metal tip, and in this gesture the electrostatic 
electricity travels to the internal metal foil of the jar. The glass in between the sheets of metal or 
“armatures” in the jar acts as an insulator, impeding charges in the external armature attracted by 
charges in the internal armature to cross over. To discharge the Leyden jar, it is enough to close 
the circuit between internal and external armature by touching the metal tip and the external 
armature with a metallic arch. If the experimenter desires to use the charge of the jar to apply it 
to some object, a conductor can be placed from the metal tip to the object, then from the object to 
the external armature, and the Leyden jar discharges the electricity onto the object. Once 
discharged, the Leyden jar has to be recharged before it can be used again.  
Figure 2. Left: Apparatus used by Galvani - three Leyden jars. Credit: Wellcome 
Collection. Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). 
 
In the same decade that the Leyden jar was invented, the scientific community became 
interested in reports of a South African eel that was capable of giving dangerous shocks. Those 
who had experienced both the electric shock of the Leyden jar and that of electric fish were 
struck by how similar they felt (Wu 1984). The Leyden jar then began to play an important role 
in the development of an electrical hypothesis for the shock that competed with Réamour’s thesis 
that the fish’s shock is mechanical in nature. The hypothesis of ‘animal electricity’ was faced 
with skepticism, and it would take various decades before it would be more extendedly accepted. 
The rejection of the hypothesis of animal electricity is a rejection of the idea that an animal could 
be thought as a container of electricity.  
 In the decade of 1790, Galvani discovered that it is possible to generate a contraction in a 
frog leg severed from the rest of the body. This discovery is often regarded in the literature as 
happening by “chance”: while one of his assistants was dissecting a frog leg, a spark jumped 
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from the electricity generator to the scalpel and provoked a contraction of the frog leg. However, 
some historians consider that even though the event may not have been planned, the whole of 
Galvani’s laboratory was prepared to study the effect of artificial electricity in muscular motion, 
so it is also not surprising that this finding occurred in such context. Accident or not, Galvani 
spend a lot of effort trying to reproduce and understand what had happened. He found that if the 
nerve and the muscle of a dissected frog leg are placed in contact with each of the extremes of 
the metallic arches like the ones with which Leyden jars are discharged, a contraction is often 
generated. There was no explanation of these behaviors at the time. Why would a frog leg 
contract with an electric discharge? Why would it contract when the nerve and muscle are 




Figure 3. Material culture elements in Galvani’s laboratory. De viribus electricitatis in motu 
musculari commentarius, cum J. Aldini dissertatione et notis. Acc. epistolae ad animalis 
electricitatis theoriam pertinentes / [Luigi Galvani]. Credit: Wellcome Collection. Attribution 4.0 
International (CC BY 4.0) 
 
Trying to explain the behavior of the frog leg, Galvani resorted to the Leyden jar as a 
(container) metaphor. Galvani treated the frog leg as a Leyden jar—he not only “discharged” the 
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frog leg with a metallic arch, but also he covered the frog leg with metal foil, which he even 
referred to as an “armature.” In a first approximation to an explanation of the contraction of the 
frog’s leg, Galvani proposed that animal electricity is “contained” in the muscle-nerve complex 
and is “liberated” when short-circuited with the metallic arch, just as it happens in a Leyden jar. 
However, at this stage the metaphor did not take Galvani exactly where he wanted. The problem 
was that animal tissue was thought to be an electric conductor at the time, so it was unclear how 
the electricities could be maintained separate. What was playing the role of the glass in the 
muscle-nerve complex?  
While addressing this issue, Galvani became interested in tourmaline. This mineral 
becomes electrically charged when heated; and physicists had recognized that this entailed that 
there is an electrical disequilibrium inside the mineral. In tourmaline the separation of 
electricities takes place in the micro scale, leading Galvani to a crucial insight: “The double 
electricity of tourmaline is not just situated in the entire stone, it is in every fragment. Similarly, 
in muscles, the admitted double electricity does not belong only to the entire muscle body, but to 
every part of it” (Galvani, 1787, 134; as cited in Piccolino and Bresaola 2013, 134). Galvani 
elaborated on the first metaphor via tourmaline, leading him to propose a causal (insulating) role 
for fatty parts of muscle that visually resemble the tiny lines in tourmaline that Galvani believed 
to operate as insulators. This evolution of the modeling process towards an explanation of the 
frog leg’s contraction involved the merging of two metaphors: the muscle-nerve complex 
separates electricities like a Leyden jar, but the insulation operates at the micro scale, as it 
happens in tourmaline.  
As mentioned above, Galvani was not the only scientist to think of organic tissue in terms 
of a Leyden jar. Rather, the handling and understanding of the Leyden jar was often extended to 
deal with and explain the behavior of muscles and nerves by scientists of the time. Indeed, 
electricity was at the time a source of metaphors that promised to solve the great dilemmas of the 
era, among them the nagging question of whether spirit and body were in some way connected. 
Scientists of the time also used other electrical devices besides the Leyden jar as material 
metaphors. For instance, Alessandro Volta argued against Galvani’s hypothesis of animal 
electricity claiming that the frog leg is not a Leyden jar but an electroscope – it responds to 
electricity but does not store electricity. In this case, as well as in Galvani’s, it is clear that this 
was not a purely theoretical issue. Volta actually used the frog leg as an electroscope, since he 
believed that the electricity came from the metallic arch, and the frog’s leg was much more 
sensitive to different constitutions in the metallic arches than the electroscopes at the time. Volta 
would combine different metals and took the intensity of the contraction as a measure of the 
metallic electricity in the stimulating arch. Weaker contractions indicated the combination of 
metals used had weaker electric powers. Thus, the frog leg became the electroscope in Volta’s 
experiments where he examined what he called metallic electricity. 
In Volta’s and Galvani’s historical dispute, Volta thought that animal electricity does not 
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exist and Galvani claimed that metallic electricity cannot explain the contraction of the frog leg 
(see Piccolino 1998). The discussion between these two scientists led to two diverging paths of 
research (see Carrillo and Martínez, forthcoming). For Galvani, the Leyden jar metaphor led to 
the discovery of a number of behaviors that showed that the frog leg contraction could be held 
without metals, and proposed an explanation of such behavior. On the other hand, the 
electroscope metaphor led Volta to a systematic study of how combination of metals generates 
electricity, leading him to the invention of the pile.  
The extended use of material metaphors was not particular of this moment of the history 
of neurophysiology. Lenoir’s nice treatment Models and Instruments in the Development of 
Electrophysiology: 1845-1912, reflects upon the role of instruments in shaping the direction of 
research: “the instruments used for detection of bioelectric currents in nerves and muscles were 
significant not just in the trivial sense that they made it possible to explore the key phenomena of 
the domain, but more importantly, the instruments themselves sometimes suggested, and on 
occasion even functioned as explanatory models for the phenomena under investigation” (1985, 
3). A possible objection to the idea that metaphors are extensively used in science would be to 
claim that the sort of “metaphoricity” that these scientists engage in may be characteristic of a 
“premature” science, but that is not how contemporary science works. However, as Mary Hesse 
and several other philosophers of science have already argued (Thomas Kuhn included) this is 
not a sustainable objection. Moreover, as we have shown elsewhere, throughout the 19th century 
scientists successfully exploited preparations like galvanic cells and later electric circuits that 
were extensively used to experiment in squid axons as material metaphors for the nerve cell 
membrane’s behavior, leading even to mathematical models (Carrillo 2018, Carrillo and 
Knuuttila 2021). More recently still, metaphors coming from thermodynamics have become 
important in challenging the electrical approaches to study the nerve impulse (Carrillo and 
Martínez, forthcoming).  
5. Conclusion 
 
The idea that metaphor plays a role in scientific innovation is not new. Various authors have 
proposed that metaphors play a role in the articulation of theories (Kuhn 1962, Hesse 1966, 
Brown 2003). In this article we focused on the cognitive role of metaphors, material metaphors 
in particular. The search for the right metaphors to address the crisis generated by COVID-19 is 
not a search for the right words to talk about the pandemic, it is an effort to grasp the meaning of 
the pandemic as a social phenomenon which will have major repercussions in the coming years, 
and simultaneously, the way in which we characterize the pandemic will have consequences. 
Analogously, Einstein’s and Darwin’s theories are closely related to metaphors which have had 
major repercussions in the way the theories have been understood. Furthermore, the metaphors 
have made connections among broad cultural issues, and thus have helped to situate the theories 
well beyond the specialized context in which they originated. The metaphors help us situate the 
novel theories in a broad cultural context, and this process generates meaning. In the case of 
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experimental science, as we have seen with the example of the Leyden jar, the metaphors in 
question are material metaphors, exploiting the skills and habits associated to laboratory culture 
to generate understanding. It is such role of metaphor in extending and composing our familiarity 
with the old to find new ways of acting that enables scientific innovation.  
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